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TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS & MAES:
THE DEALMAKER’S CRYSTAL BALL
Christina M. Sautter*
INTRODUCTION
Crises provoke behavior modifications.1 This is particularly true with
dealmakers in the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) world as, even in the best
of times, every M&A transaction is an exercise in risk allocation.2 As a crisis
unfolds, two questions inevitably arise for dealmakers: in the short term,
what grounds may parties use to exit pending transactions; and, in the long
term, what impact will the crisis have on negotiating current and future deals
and drafting related contractual provisions.3 In many M&A transactions,
especially those involving publicly traded companies, the answers to both
questions almost always involve material adverse effect (MAE) or material
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1
Kathleen Grave, Demos Vardiabasis & Burhan Yavas, The Global Financial Crisis and
M&A, 7 INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT., June 2012, at 56, 63 (“From crisis comes change and new
behaviors.”).
2
R. Tyler Hand, Managing Risks and Liabilities in Today’s M&A Market, in M&A DEAL
STRATEGIES:
LEADING LAWYERS ON CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE, NEGOTIATING
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, AND SUCCEEDING IN A POST-RECESSION MARKET *1
2015 WL 1802924 (2015) (stating that “every transaction involves some degree of risk,”
which presents an “opportunity to add value by creating effective solutions to manage risks
. . . [and] facilitate successful transactions”).
3
Priscilla C. Hughes & Seth B. Bryant, Will the MAC Clause Become a Permanent Deal
Stopper?, 37 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Apr. 2002, at 27, ProQuest Doc. No. 215916351
(discussing the impact of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on M&A activity and the use
of material adverse change (MAC) clauses); Brain Salsberg, The Case for M&A in a
Downturn, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 17, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/05/the-case-for-ma-in-adownturn [https://perma.cc/DT6Y-7WZ9] (drawing parallels between the actions of
dealmakers in prior crises to the crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic and noting that although
transactions halted at the beginning of the virus to deal with short-term issues, dealmakers
will now look to the future for recovery and impact); Andrew A. Schwartz, A “Standard
Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine and the Material Adverse Change Clause, 57
UCLA L. REV. 789, 820 (2010) (noting the economic realities and rise in prominence of the
MAC clause as a result of events such as “the dot-com stock crash, the attacks of September
11, 2001, the spectacular frauds at Enron and Worldcom, the bursting of the housing bubble,
and what may have been the worst recession since the Great Depression”).
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adverse change (MAC) provisions.4 These provisions allow parties, typically
the acquirer, to exit a transaction without penalty if the other party has
suffered a MAE, as that term is defined in the agreement.5
Not surprisingly, MAEs have recently taken center stage in the dealmaking
world. Since early 2020 the world has been living through an extraordinary
crisis: the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic is unlike past crises such as
September 11, 2001, the resulting escalation of the war on terror, and the
Great Recession of 2007–2009. September 11 was tragic in terms of lives
lost and it, along with the Great Recession, had severe financial impacts. The
pandemic, however, has not only resulted in over 1 million deaths to date but
caused economies worldwide to come to an unprecedented grinding halt.6 As
the world went into lockdown, many dealmakers scurried to evaluate the
impact on pending deals, with a number opting to terminate or renegotiate
agreements.7 As the pandemic stretches on, dealmaking has resumed amidst
the looming uncertainty of what economic impacts the continuing pandemic
may have—not only on a global macro level but also for specific companies
and industries. Dealmakers must now consider these uncertainties when
negotiating transaction provisions, particularly MAEs.
This Essay examines MAEs through the lens of transaction cost economics
(TCE), a theory first proposed in 1937 and utilized to determine how to best
structure transactions8 especially amidst uncertainty. Uncertainties are
inherent in purchasing a highly specific asset, like a company, which are
4
MAEs and MACs refer to the same type of provision and this Essay uses the terms
interchangeably.
5
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 789. See also infra Part II.
6
WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://covid19.who.int/?gclid=CjwKCAjwz6_8BRBkEiwA3p02VToJoS_G8prFqkbn6SSRI
NtFZXDRTGHf10VcKWHtRoXsDnszAz6f_xoCxDsQAvD_BwE (Dec. 19, 2020, 9:45 AM)
[https://perma.cc/JLE6-DB7P] (stating that as of 9:45 AM CET on December 19, 2020 there
were 1,663,474 reported COVID-19 deaths). See Lora Jones et al., Coronavirus: A Visual
Guide
to
the
Economic
Impact,
BBC
NEWS
(June
29,
2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51706225 (detailing the pandemic’s spread and effect on
the global market and how it has left businesses around the world looking for recovery). See
generally JAMES K. JACKSON ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46270, GLOBAL ECONOMIC
EFFECTS
OF
COVID-19
(2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R46270.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LFU7-FL6R] (providing data and predictions on COVID-19’s impacts on
the global economy).
7
Nabila Ahmed, Virus Upends $87 Billion of Deals in Sign of Corporate Fears,
BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0629/virus-upends-87-billion-of-deals-in-sign-of-corporate-fears (stating that at least $87 billion
worth of deals had been terminated or put on hold since the pandemic); Cara Lombardo &
Dana Cimilluca, Tiffany Agrees to New Deal Terms with LVMH, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2020,
5:01 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiffany-lvmh-near-agreement-on-new-dealterms-11603899275?st=ssaie27q83sp2lt&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
[https://perma.cc/MS2V-Y43G] (stating LVMH argued the pandemic damaged Tiffany’s
business to the extent that the agreement was invalid and renegotiated for an over $400 million
discount); Fareed Sahloul, Coronavirus Pandemic Drags Global M&A to Lowest Level Since
2012, BLOOMBERG (June 30, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2020-06-30/coronavirus-pandemic-drags-global-m-a-to-lowest-level-since-2012
[https://perma.cc/F2TF-39WT] (stating that the coronavirus pandemic “brought global
dealmaking to an abrupt halt”).
8
See infra notes 14–23 and accompanying text.
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further compounded by external socioeconomic conditions.9 This, in turn,
gives rise to higher transaction costs, such as due diligence, increased
negotiations, and ex post enforcement.10 MAE provisions are one of the ways
in which dealmakers attempt to control the transaction costs of ex post
enforcement.11 As life in a pandemic becomes the new reality, dealmakers
are adjusting to ensure that pandemic-related effects do not trigger MAEs.12
Consequently, this raises transaction costs and has an impact on whether a
deal is signed and ultimately consummated, and on what terms.13
This Essay attempts to look into the dealmaker’s crystal ball to foresee
those changes. Part I of this Essay briefly describes TCE and the relevant
assumptions underlying the theory. Part II explains how dealmakers have
structured MAEs to control for closing uncertainty and briefly describes how
courts have interpreted MAEs. Finally, Part III discusses how dealmakers
have dealt with the pandemic in terms of MAEs and argues that while revised
MAEs may complicate dealmaking, they will not hinder it. Part III argues
that, in place of the traditional role of a MAE, dealmakers instead will take
other steps to compensate for uncertainty, including expanded due diligence,
adjusted valuations, provisions to renegotiate terms, or reverse termination
fees.
I. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS
TCE theory explores how to structure businesses and complex transactions
to make them more efficient.14 TCE originated with economist Ronald H.
Coase in 1937.15 Coase introduced the idea that firms are formed to save on
market costs, now known as transaction costs.16 Another noted economist,
Oliver Williamson, popularized TCE in a series of articles and books from
the 1970s to the 1990s. In particular, Williamson applied TCE to vertical
integrations and considered whether it was better to integrate or to buy in the

9

See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
11
See infra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
12
See infra Part III. Although this Essay is focused on MAEs, dealmakers have also been
concerned with the pandemic’s effects on non-MAE provisions, such as interim operating
covenants, which are also discussed in Part III.
13
See infra Part III.
14
See generally Mikko Ketokivi & Joseph T. Mahoney, Transaction Cost Economics as
a Theory of the Firm, Management, and Governance, OXFORD RSCH. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUS.
& MGMT. (Oct.
26,
2017),
https://oxfordre.com/business/view/10.1093/acrefore/
9780190224851.001.0001/acrefore-9780190224851-e-6
[https://perma.cc/H6P4-F5J4]
(stating that TCE “is a theory of how business transactions are structured in challenging
decision environments” and tends to focus on “commitments that are difficult to reverse
without significant economic loss”).
15
See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937)
(introducing TCE theory); see also C.N. Pitelis, Transaction Costs and the Historical
Evolution of the Capitalist Firm, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 999, 999 (1998) (summarizing Coase’s
theory).
16
Coase, supra note 15, at 392.
10
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market.17 But his prolific research has been extended and applied well
beyond vertical integrations.18 According to Williamson, TCE consists of
three dimensions: asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of the
transactions occurring.19 Asset specificity refers to the transferability of
assets to alternative uses; thus, higher asset specificity results in higher
transaction costs.20 Uncertainty refers to the threat of opportunism or the
behavioral uncertainty of a buyer or seller.21 Frequency refers to the number
of times a transaction is expected to take place.22 If a transaction is a onetime deal, it will not be efficient to devote significant resources to its
coordination; however, if the transaction has a high frequency, the cost of
allocating resources to its arrangements is efficient and justified.23 Of
particular import for M&A and MAEs are uncertainty and asset specificity.24
As stated above, asset specificity involves how a specific asset may be
used.25 If the asset is unique to particular parties, and therefore has limited
transferability, then it has higher transaction costs.26 Asset specificity has
been most studied and applied in vertical integration settings.27 But the
concept is equally applicable in the context of larger M&A transactions. In
these transactions, the target company is a highly specific asset. The
potential transaction is generally unique in terms of achieving economies of
scale or scope and synergies. For the acquirer, there may be a very limited
number of companies with which it can achieve such value. From the target’s

17
See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION 95–101, 107 (1975);
see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 3–12 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS] (summarizing previous literature focusing on contract law and economic
organization); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 364–72 (1996)
(self-reflecting on his own application of transaction cost economics to vertical integration
during the 1970s).
18
Robert Gibbons, Transaction-Cost Economics: Past, Present, and Future?, 112
SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 263, 275–76 (2010) (stating that, in addition to his vertical integration
work, “Williamson also performed more applied analyses on topics relating [to] law and
economics, such as antitrust (1968) and regulation (1976), and edited a book of contributions
(including one of his own) on Chester Barnard and organization theory (1990).”).
19
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17, at 52–61.
20
Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost
Approach, 87 AM. J. SOCIO. 548, 555 (1981).
21
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 253–54 (1979).
22
Id. at 246–47.
23
Id.
24
Because most M&A deals are one-time deals, under the frequency dimension, they are
inefficient in terms of the amount of resources devoted to them. This increases transaction
costs.
25
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
26
Williamson, supra note 21, at 239–40. Williamson identified at least four types of
asset specificity, including physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, site specificity,
and dedicated assets. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17, at 55.
27
Williamson, supra note 21, at 240 (arguing that internal production is an attractive
structure of idiosyncratic (i.e., highly specific) transactions); Williamson, supra note 20, at
555–56 (studying asset specificity as applied to vertical integration).
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perspective, a similarly small number of acquirers likely exists. Accordingly,
the entire transaction is highly specific.
M&A deals inevitably involve uncertainty. Dealmakers cannot be
completely certain about decisions—and M&A contracts reflect this.
Uncertainty is demonstrated both in provisions like MAEs and by way of
what the parties do not contract for.28 In fact, TCE recognizes that contracts
are incomplete.29 Incompleteness is a result of parties entering into contracts
without all of the necessary and relevant information that would otherwise
make them complete.30 This information void may stem from parties
withholding information, their inability to comprehend or synchronize the
information they do have, or the inability to predict future events.31 In
behavioral economics, when parties act within their own self-interests (such
as withholding information), this is known as opportunism.32 The ability to
comprehend or synchronize information is known as bounded rationality.33
Opportunism is the assumption that transacting parties will use tactics such
as deception to withhold information to maximize their own interests.34 A
party may purposefully disclose biased or partial information designed to
advantage themselves over the other party.35 Often this asymmetrical
dissemination of information results in an impairment of negotiations.36
Opportunism also affects the execution and renewal of contracts.37 Parties
who act in their own self-interest incur major transaction costs in monitoring
and enforcing the contract.38
Bounded rationality is the assumption that most transactions occur with
rational actors that have limited information.39 Two examples of bounded
rationality include: (1) it is costly for a party to convey information to the
other party, possibly because the receiving party is less sophisticated and
cannot comprehend it; and (2) it may be difficult for one party to
communicate the intricacies of the information because those very nuances

28
Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of
Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 856–59 (2010) (explaining that parties often
purposely utilize vague terms to control for uncertainty).
29
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and
Economics, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 99, 102 (1993); see also Williamson,
supra note 20, at 553–54 (stating that given the complexity inherent in all contracting,
“incomplete contracting is the best that can be achieved”).
30
Williamson, supra note 20, at 553–54.
31
Id. at 553 (“The two behavioral assumptions on which transaction cost analysis relies
that both add realism and distinguish this approach from neoclassical economics are (1) the
recognition that human agents are subject to bounded rationality and (2) the assumption that
at least some agents are given to opportunism.”).
32
Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations, 63
AM. ECON. REV. 316, 317 (1973).
33
Id. at 317.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Williamson, supra note 29, at 109.
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are not clear to the disclosing party itself.40 Furthermore, parties are unable
to predict the future, which is particularly relevant currently as the COVID19 pandemic was generally unexpected. Moreover, this inability to predict
the future has a potentially greater impact on M&A transactions which take
longer to sign and close than typical consumer contracts.
The combination of higher asset specificity and uncertainty, stemming
from bounded rationality and opportunism, increases transaction costs.41
Transaction costs are defined as “search and information costs, bargaining
and decision costs, [and] policing and enforcement costs.”42 As Professor
Carl Dahlman stated, these unique categories of costs all share one core
element in that “they represent resource losses due to lack of information.”43
Thus, no matter how much parties may desire to do a deal, they are
contracting under a veil of uncertainty. For example, an acquirer does not
fully know all the information pertaining to the target’s value. Likewise, a
target cannot be positive the acquirer is offering the maximum it is willing to
pay. Meanwhile, neither party can be completely sure what may unfold
between signing and closing—i.e., during the pre-closing period—which
may affect the pending transaction. As Williamson eloquently wrote, “all of
the relevant contracting action cannot be concentrated on the ex ante
incentive alignment but some of it spills over into ex post governance.”44
II. USING THE PAST TO THE PREDICT THE FUTURE
The “ex ante alignment” and “ex post governance” to which Williamson
alluded is on full display in any merger agreement. A merger agreement’s
primary functions are to control for and allocate the various systemic and
business risks at play and to plan for what may happen if actual results are
different than expected.45 The parties accomplish this through numerous
provisions, the MAE being one of the most significant.46 In drafting MAEs,
dealmakers attempt to allocate risk and plan for uncertainties while also
responding to crises and MAE jurisprudence. This Part briefly describes the
uses and construction of MAEs and MAE jurisprudence to date, all of which
aids in determining how dealmakers will respond in the future.

40

Id. at 103–04.
See Sumit K. Majumdar & Venkatram Ramaswamy, On the Role of Social Asset
Specificity in the Channel Integration Decision, 150 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON.
375, 378 (1994) (noting that bounded rationality and “complexity and uncertainty” give rise
to transaction costs).
42
Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979).
43
Id.
44
Williamson, supra note 29, at 102.
45
Jeffrey Manns & Robert Anderson IV, The Merger Agreement Myth, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 1143, 1153 (2013).
46
Robert T. Miller, Material Adverse Effect Clauses and the COVID-19 Pandemic 3
(Univ. of Iowa, Coll. Of L., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-21, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3603055 [https://perma.cc/J2EP-GN5R].
41
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A. Construction of MAEs and the Role of MAEs in Agreements
MAEs perform a few roles in an agreement. First, they are used as
materiality modifiers in representations and warranties.47 For example, a
target may represent that there is no known pending or threated litigation that,
individually or in the aggregate, has triggered or would trigger a MAE for
the target. In addition, there is typically a representation that there has not
been a MAE.48 Finally, MAEs are used as conditions precedent to the closing
of a transaction.49 As a closing condition, the acquirer is able to walk away
from a transaction if there has been a MAE without being held liable for a
breach of contract.50 Accordingly, the definition of what constitutes a MAE
becomes of primary importance and is also highly negotiated.51
MAE definitions consist of three portions. First is the standard MAE
clause allowing the acquirer to exit a transaction. This is typically defined
broadly to include events or changes that, individually or in the aggregate,
have had or are reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect.52 Of note
is the circularity of the definition in that the term “material adverse effect” is
generally used to define a MAE.53 Moreover, as Professor Andrew Schwartz
has noted, the term “material” as used in the MAE is not defined and is left
to the courts’ interpretation.54 Finally, the effect is often broken down further
into two parts and means to have an effect (1) on the ability to close the
transaction or (2) on the business of the target taken as a whole.55
The second part of the MAE includes a comprehensive set of detailed
carve-outs which only modify the effect of these events or changes on the
business (they do not modify the ability to close).56 These function as
47

FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ & CHRISTINA M. SAUTTER, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS LAW
46 (2018).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Miller, supra note 46, at 27.
52
For example, the Morgan Stanley-E*TRADE Agreement defines the general MAE as
“any event, circumstance, development, change, occurrence or effect that, individually or in
the aggregate, is or is reasonably likely to result in, a material adverse effect” Morgan Stanley,
Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1, § 1.01) (Feb. 21, 2020).
53
Miller, supra note 46, at 2.
54
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 826-27.
55
The Morgan Stanley-E*TRADE MAE definition is broken down in this manner. It
requires that the effect be
on (x) the condition (financial or otherwise), assets, liabilities, business or results of
operations of the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, or (y) the ability
of the Company and its Subsidiaries to timely consummate the Closing (including
the Merger) on the terms set forth herein or to perform their agreements or covenants
hereunder.
Morgan Stanley, supra note 52 (defining “Company Material Adverse Effect”).
56
For example, the Morgan Stanley-E*TRADE MAE definition states:
[P]rovided that, in the case of clause (x) only, no event, circumstance, development,
change, occurrence or effect to the extent resulting from, arising out of, or relating
to any of the following shall be deemed to constitute, or shall be taken into account
in determining whether there has been, a Company Material Adverse Effect, or
whether a Company Material Adverse Effect would reasonably be expected to
occur.
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exceptions to the standard MAE clause, preventing the acquirer from exiting.
Over the years, the number of carve-outs has grown significantly.57 The
carve-outs include changes to law, acts of God, failure to meet estimates or
projections, and similar items unique to the company.58 As will be described
in Part III, pandemics are generally now included as a specific carve-out.59
The third, and final, portion of the MAE definition is the exception to some
of the carve-outs. This allows the events identified in particular carve-outs
to serve as a basis for the acquirer to walk if the effect has been
disproportionate to the target and its subsidiaries considered together as a
whole as compared to other companies in the target’s industry.60 Pandemic
and acts of God carve-outs, among others, typically qualify for this
exception.61 As such, if pandemics are carved out, negative effects on the
business will not rise to the MAE level unless those negative effects are
disproportionate in comparison to the industry in which the company
operates. But, as will be discussed in Part II.C below, disproportionate
effects are a difficult standard to satisfy.62
B. Impact of September 11 and the Great Recession on MAEs
Financial crises, like the economic downturn after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks and the Great Recession of 2007–2009, have influenced the
Id.
57
Compare Warren S. de Wied, The Impact of September 11 on M&A Transactions,
M&A LAW., Oct. 2001, at 1, Westlaw, 5 No. 5 GLMALAW 1 (explaining that parties typically
decline to adopt specific carve-outs, finding that four general carve-outs sufficiently address
most risks), with Miller, supra note 46, at 21 (stating that most MAE provisions carve-out
various classes of risk), and Miller, supra note 46, at 27 (noting that sophisticated commercial
parties regularly use elaborate MAE clauses).
58
Matthew Jennejohn, Julian Nyarko, & Eric Talley, COVID-19 as Force Majeure in
Corporate Transactions, in LAW IN THE TIME OF COVID-19, 141, 142 (Katharina Pistor ed.,
2020), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/240/ [https://perma.cc/9WXJ-ZCBF]
(listing carve-outs in the LVMH-Tiffany transaction); see also Morgan Stanley, supra note 52
(defining “Company Material Adverse Effect” and including an extensive list of carve-outs).
59
See infra Part III.
60
For example, the Morgan Stanley–E*TRADE definition includes the following
exception to the carve-outs:
[E]xcept in the case of [selected carve-out clauses, including the one relating to
pandemics and COVID-19], to the extent that any such event, circumstance,
development, change, occurrence or effect has a disproportionate adverse effect on
the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, relative to the adverse effect
such event, circumstance, development, change, occurrence or effect has on other
companies operating in the securities brokerage industry or the other industries in
which the Company or any of its Subsidiaries materially engages.
Morgan Stanley, supra note 52, at Exhibit 2.1, § 1.01 (defining “Company Material Adverse
Effect”).
61
See, e.g., id. (referencing specific clauses). In the Morgan Stanley-E*TRADE deal,
deals that qualified for the exception were changes “in general United States or global
economic conditions”; changes in the securities brokerage industry or other industries in
which the company operates; changes in law or U.S. generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP); or “any acts of God, natural disasters, terrorism, armed hostilities, sabotage, war or
any escalation or worsening of acts of war, epidemic, pandemic or disease outbreak (including
the COVID-19 virus).” Id.
62
See infra Part II.C.
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negotiation and drafting of MAE provisions.63 These impacts were mainly
due to the economic volatility that followed each of these events.64
At the start of the twenty-first century, MAEs typically did not include the
vast laundry list of carve-outs present in today’s MAE definitions. Prior to
2001, MAE provisions contained only a few general carve-outs for: (1)
changes in general economic or financial market conditions; (2) changes in
general industry conditions; (3) changes in market prices for parties’ stock;
and (4) changes in law.65 Dealmakers typically did not include more specific
carve-outs. However, in the wake of September 11 and the resulting financial
uncertainty, attorneys and their clients increased their focus on the MAE and
its role in M&A deals. The cluster of deal terminations that followed the
September 11 attacks highlighted the significance of addressing
extraordinary events in acquisition agreements.66 As parties attempted to
mitigate their risks pertaining to such events, negotiations resulted in more
specified MAE clauses.67 Deals announced after September 11 began
referencing, explicitly or impliedly, acts of terrorism—some agreements
incorporated similar attacks into the MAE definition, but a majority of
agreements explicitly carved them out.68 Similarly, as the 2007 financial
crisis (which ultimately gave rise to the Great Recession) unfolded, many
buyers attempted to walk away from deals claiming a MAE.69 In addition,
like after September 11, dealmakers responded to the increased financial
uncertainty by including more carve-outs, thus shifting the risk to buyers.70
As a result of adverse economic conditions in 2001 (and again in 2008), MAE
provisions are now among the most negotiated terms of any transaction.71
C. Interpretation and Application of MAEs
In predicting the impact of post-pandemic MAEs (in particular, pandemic
carve-outs), on deal terms and future deals, a key consideration is how courts
63

Schwartz, supra note 3, at 820.
Id.
65
de Wied, supra note 57.
66
Yair Y. Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed Economy, 2002
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 846, 847 (2002).
67
See generally Jeffrey L. Rothschild & Thomas Sauermilch, Impact of Financial
Markets Crisis on MAC Clauses, INSIDE M&A (McDermott Will & Emery), Nov.–Dec. 2008.
68
See id. at 863; MAC the Knife, ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2001, at 57, 57–58, ProQuest Doc.
No. 224056217.
69
See Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse
Termination Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2010).
70
Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual Conditions, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 755, 760 (2009) (utilizing an empirical study to show that dealmakers responded to
uncertainty in 2007 and 2008 with more “expansive” MAEs).
71
Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in
Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 330 (2005) (noting that MAC clauses are now some
of the most prominently negotiated provisions in M&A deals); Franci J. Blassberg, Asset
Purchase Agreement, in CORPORATE MERGER & ACQUISITION (ALI-ABA Continuing Legal
Education, Coursebook Series No. SP031) 139, 191 n.93 (2008) (stating that the events of
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interpret MAE provisions. As a general matter, the courts have interpreted
MAE provisions narrowly with a strict burden on the party invoking the
MAE.72 In In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,73 the Delaware Chancery
Court famously held that a “short-term hiccup in earnings” would not trigger
a MAE and that negative effects must be “material when viewed from the
longer-term perspective of a reasonable acquirer.”74 The court also reasoned
that a MAE “is best read as a backstop protecting the acquiror from the
occurrence of unknown events that substantially threaten the overall earnings
potential of the target in a durationally-significant manner.”75 Several years
later, in Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp.,76 the Chancery
Court reiterated the need for long-term effects to trigger a MAE.77 It
reasoned that although evidence of a significant decline in the target’s
earnings during the pre-closing period is relevant, for such a decline to trigger
a MAE, declines in earnings must “persist significantly into the future.”78
The court also examined the company as a whole compared to the greater
industry instead of relying on the poor performance of certain divisions, and
the court pointed out that while the two divisions at issue may have been
materially compromised, the company as a whole was not so impaired by
their loss.79
More recently, in Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG,80 the Chancery Court
repeated the standards set forth in In re IBP and Hexion but found that the
target, Akorn, Inc. (“Akorn”), had suffered a MAE.81 The court noted that
the facts of Akorn were significantly different from other MAE cases in
which buyers were trying to escape a transaction due to a cyclical downturn.82
More specifically, Fresenius Kabi AG (“Fresenius”) demonstrated that
Akorn’s regulatory compliance issues were so significant and in breach of
the representation that they would likely amount to a MAE.83 Further,
Fresenius demonstrated that Akorn’s decline in performance resulted from a
“company-specific problem” as opposed to an industry-wide issue.84 The
court also noted that if it assumed that industry-wide conditions caused

72
See In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001) (setting the
standard for a strict burden and a narrow interpretation of MAC clauses); see also Hexion
Specialty Chems. Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch. 2008) (finding the
same).
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Akorn’s poor performance, then Akorn was disproportionately affected.85
Moreover, the events that caused Akorn’s issues were unanticipated by both
parties.86 Accordingly, Akorn became the first case in which the Delaware
courts found that a company suffered a MAE.87 As dealmakers look forward
after Akorn, they know that it is at least possible to satisfy the heavy burden
of proving a MAE. But Akorn also has quite unique facts which are not likely
to be replicated in deals in which parties are attempting to exit for pandemicrelated downturns.88
III. THE DEALMAKER’S CRYSTAL BALL: PREDICTING THE IMPACT OF
MAES ON DEAL TERMS AND FUTURE DEALS
Generally, dealmakers quickly respond to socioeconomic forces and the
COVID-19 pandemic has been no different.89 This is evident when
examining MAE provisions in deals executed since February 2020. A survey
of acquisitions of U.S. public target companies of $500 million or more in
deal value executed between February 1, 2020, and September 18, 2020,
revealed thirty-two transactions.90 Of those, thirty transactions (or almost 94
percent) included carve-outs for pandemics, epidemics, outbreak of disease
or illness, COVID-19, shutdowns, quarantine, or some combination
thereof.91 Only two transactions did not contain any COVID-19, pandemic,
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shutdown, or quarantine language.92 Both of those transactions were
executed in late February or early March, just weeks before the World Health
Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11, 2020.93
This brief survey is consistent with and continues the trend found in
Professors Matthew Jennejohn, Julian Nyarko, and Eric Talley’s recent
research. They found that in deals spanning from October 2019 to March
2020, over 65 percent of MAE provisions contained explicit “pandemic” (or
the semantic equivalent) or general carve-outs, compared with 40 percent
between 2003 and 2018.94 This research also revealed that, within the last
two years, the percentage of pandemic-specific carve-outs doubled and the
percentage of MAE provisions containing these carve-outs—whether
specific or general—increased by at least 20 percent.95 These statistics reveal
that as pandemics, or the possibility thereof, become the “new normal,”
dealmakers are responding to the related uncertainty by attempting to make
their contracts more complete.
In terms of contract completeness and controlling for unknowns relating
to the current pandemic, some parties have gone further than simply carving
out COVID-19 in the MAE definition. For example, in Sunrun Inc.’s
(“Sunrun”) acquisition of Vivint Solar, Inc. (“Vivint”), the parties not only
carved out COVID-19 but also specifically agreed that it (along with related
changes to laws and policies) had not disproportionately affected Vivint as
of the July 6, 2020 agreement date.96 The parties did not stop there—the
definition also stated that any changes to laws or guidelines promulgated by
a governmental entity in response to COVID-19 would not constitute a MAE
92
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even if the effect of the change is materially disproportionate.97 Likewise,
the definition of a MAE relating to the acquirer, Sunrun, tracked the same
language.98
Moving forward, at least some dealmakers will likely follow in Sunrun’s
and Vivint’s footsteps and take pandemic-related MAEs off the table
altogether. This allows for more confidence in deal closing and eliminates
pre-closing opportunism.
Even if a deal does not include a Sunrun-Vivint-type of provision and
dealmakers opt only for a pandemic carve-out, the ability to prove a
pandemic-related MAE will be quite slim. This, in turn leads to a number of
ripple effects and issues. The first issue is what role, if any, will MAEs play
in the future? One possibility is that buyers may use MAEs (possibly along
with other agreement terms like closing conditions) to pressure a target to
renegotiate a transaction. Another possibility is that the inclusion of a MAE
with pandemic-related carve-outs may help to signal to the target that the
buyer is a serious one as it is willing to shoulder pandemic-related risks.
The ever-shrinking universe of MAE triggers and the courts’ narrow
interpretation of them make other pre-signing items, such as due diligence,
increasingly significant. Whether or not pandemic-related MAEs are
completely carved out, like in the Sunrun-Vivint deal, dealmakers are likely
to engage in even more thorough due diligence to ensure that they understand
the transaction risks. They will be expected to keep a particular eye on
possible impacts of the pandemic both in the short and long term. These
impacts could range from labor and employment matters to privacy matters
to antitrust matters and beyond.99 However, the question remains whether
dealmakers will be able to accurately forecast the effects of the information
they have.
The ripple effect of pandemic-related carve-outs continues beyond due
diligence and into deal term negotiations. Namely, dealmakers will pay close
attention to non-MAE provisions to compensate for the role that MAEs
previously played in mitigating risks. More specifically, dealmakers will
focus on provisions, like the ordinary course of business covenant, allowing
a party to walk away from the transaction if there is a breach. This is a typical
covenant that requires that the target continue to run the business in the
97
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“ordinary course” and ensures that the status quo of the company
continues.100 The covenant generally requires the buyer’s consent to take
actions that are outside of the ordinary course.101 The covenant should
address what a target may and may not do during the “ordinary course” of
business as defined in the specific context of a pandemic. However, the
ripple effect does not stop with traditional deal terms like the ordinary course
of business covenant.
As dealmakers look into the crystal ball, there is opportunity for them to
rethink deal terms that may act in the place of MAEs. Unfortunately,
dealmakers are never going to be contracting in a perfect world without
bounded rationality and opportunism. But they can innovate in how they
respond to issues of ex post governance. For example, parties may consider
a covenant specifically setting forth the parameters regarding renegotiation
of an agreement if the negative effects on the target reach certain significant
predetermined levels. This would in effect act similarly to a price
adjustment, but only in the gravest of situations. Another option could
require the acquirer to pay a substantial reverse termination fee if the acquirer
claims a MAE and refuses to close.
Reverse termination fees (paid by an acquirer to a target upon termination)
are not new deal terms. Dealmakers began to use them more frequently
during the private equity boom immediately preceding the Great Recession
as a way of controlling for financing risk.102 As the 2007 financial crisis took
hold, buyers attempted to exit transactions and simply pay the reverse
termination fee, arguing that they had contracted for that option in lieu of
closing.103 Of course, a substantial reverse termination fee is no substitute
for full deal value. So, at the time, taking the reverse termination fee “option”
did not sit well with targets.104 In today’s dealmaking world, reverse
termination fees are common and are typically triggered for terminations
stemming from a lack of financing or the inability to obtain antitrust consents.
As such, targets should not be caught off-guard if acquirers use the fees as
acquirers did during the financial crisis. In fact, targets can now plan for it
and negotiate even more substantial reverse termination fees.
The ripple effects continue beyond deal terms and termination fees to deal
value. In particular, some argue that deal values may go down as acquirers
account for the continuing effects of the pandemic due to increased
uncertainty with respect to further virus waves and vaccine development.105
As described earlier, uncertainty in the context of asset specificity makes
negotiating a deal and reaching an agreement more difficult but certainly not
impossible.106 In performing increased due diligence and negotiations, the
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parties, particularly the acquirer, incur additional transaction costs which will
likely be reflected in the purchase price. Furthermore, the lack of certainty
regarding what the future holds and market volatility may also impact deal
value. Moreover, now that we have had one modern-day global pandemic
resulting in a global shutdown, dealmakers may be wary that another
unrelated pandemic is possible.
These legitimate concerns, combined with the likelihood that an acquirer
will not be able to exit a deal based on a MAE, have not stopped dealmaking.
A number of high-value M&A transactions have been executed since March
2020.107 In fact, Sunday, September 13, 2020 and Monday, September 14,
2020 was the “fastest start to a week for global dealmaking” since November
2019.108 But could those September deals have been valued even higher in
non-pandemic times? This is certainly a possibility, although not the subject
of this Essay. However, what has become clear in recent months is that the
pandemic is not going to stop dealmaking. In fact, it may even ultimately
spur consolidations in certain industries. As deals continue, likely with
pandemic-related MAE carve-outs, and dealmakers look into their crystal
balls, an opportunity for creativity in dealmaking exists.
CONCLUSION
As dealmakers refine MAEs to adjust for uncertainties relating to the
COVID-19 pandemic, they incur increased transaction costs. These
increased costs may simply be the cost of dealmaking in the “new normal”
world. Refined MAEs are not going to stop deals from being done. The only
question becomes: how much risk are dealmakers willing to take on in the
short term in return for a potentially considerable gain in the long term? If
anything is clear as dealmakers look into their crystal ball, it is that hope
creates opportunity but so does chaos.
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